--- title: "Energy Grid SCADA Security by Firevault - Control for elect…" description: "Physically isolate transmission and distribution SCADA, IEC 61850 substations and DER control. Evidence for NIS2, NERC CIP and Ofgem." lang: en-GB json-ld: | [ { "@context": "https://schema.org", "@type": "WebPage", "@id": "https://fire-vault.com/control-for-energy#webpage", "url": "https://fire-vault.com/control-for-energy", "name": "Energy Grid SCADA Security by Firevault - Control for elect…", "description": "Physically isolate transmission and distribution SCADA, IEC 61850 substations and DER control. 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When those paths converge, a single compromise can move from an office to a breaker. Control puts a real boundary at every step. - Ransomware in EMS and SCADA - IT to OT lateral movement - Third-party vendor access - IEC 61850 substation risk Schedule a Demo[Back to Utilities](/control-for-utilities) ![Electrical grid control room with transmission pylons beyond](/assets/sector-square-energy-B2ZOZka5.jpg) Exposure How it worksExplore moreQuestions The exposure in numbers 01 Substation path isolation from corporate IT 100% Substation path isolation from corporate IT 02 Persistent OEM access into protection systems Zero Persistent OEM access into protection systems 03 Control modules deployed per electricity zone 6 Control modules deployed per electricity zone 04 Evidence for NIS2, NERC CIP and Ofgem Full Evidence for NIS2, NERC CIP and Ofgem The Challenge ## Electricity control networks are converging faster than they can be defended. 01 ### IT, OT and market convergence Trading, settlement and ENCC interfaces sit close to the same control rooms that operate the grid. Attackers traverse those interfaces to reach EMS and SCADA. 02 ### Legacy protection alongside IEC 61850 Substations carry a mix of legacy RTUs and modern IEC 61850 IEDs. They cannot all be patched on the same cycle without risking operational disruption. 03 ### Distributed energy resources Inverter-based resources and DER orchestration multiply the number of remotely reachable controllers across the distribution grid. Energy > When EMS, SCADA and substation networks are reachable from corporate or vendor estates, every software vulnerability becomes a candidate for a switching incident. The Scenario ### Scenario: Substation vendor remote access compromise Attackers compromise a protection vendor laptop with persistent VPN access into a transmission substation engineering network. From there they pivot through a shared jump server into the control room SCADA. Operators lose visibility across two grid supply points for several hours. Restoration is delayed because protection setting backups are stored on the same domain that was compromised. With Control, vendor access opens only on a scheduled, authorised window. The substation fabric is physically separate from the control room fabric. Verified baselines for protection settings are held on infrastructure with no live network path to production and require multi-party authorisation to release. The pivot path does not exist. "We assumed our substations were isolated. They were, until a vendor laptop was trusted on both sides at the same time." Module deployment · electricity network ## Where each Control module is deployed across generation, transmission and distribution. Electricity operators run a Purdue stack from the corporate estate down to substation protection. Control puts a real boundary between the office, the operations centre and the substations so a problem in one place does not become a blackout in another. Grounded in NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, IEC 62443-3-2, IEC 61850, NERC CIP-005 and NCSC CAF. L5 Cloud / Internet External Market interfaces Cloud services Settlement, ENCC and market data. Settlement, ENCC and market data. ![FV-Firebreak module icon](/assets/firebreak-icon-7zSCkB1t.png)Firebreak ![FV-Validate module icon](/assets/vault-icon-DWJpRH8k.png)Validate Market and cloud traffic terminates at the perimeter. L4 Enterprise IT SOC SIEM Active Directory Trading systems Office, trading and corporate identity. Office, trading and corporate identity. ![FV-Isolate module icon](/assets/isolate-icon-B9t8fl3o.png)Isolate ![FV-Firebreak module icon](/assets/firebreak-icon-7zSCkB1t.png)Firebreak Office estate cannot reach the industrial DMZ on its own. L3.5 Industrial DMZ DMZ · trust boundary Jump server Patch & AV ICCP gateway Brokered exchange. No straight-through paths into operations. Brokered exchange. No straight-through paths into operations. ![FV-Relay module icon](/assets/relay-icon-CVhJDRO7.png)Relay ![FV-Validate module icon](/assets/vault-icon-DWJpRH8k.png)Validate ![FV-Execute module icon](/assets/execute-icon-kJl5Gtmk.png)Execute ICCP and engineering traffic crosses on scheduled, approved routes. L3 Control centre systems OT EMS / DMS Historian DERMS Energy management, distribution management, DER orchestration. Energy management, distribution management, DER orchestration. ![FV-Isolate module icon](/assets/isolate-icon-B9t8fl3o.png)Isolate ![FV-Lock module icon](/assets/lock-icon-UU3vOaKE.png)Lock Control centre and SCADA on separate fabrics. L2 Supervisory control OT SCADA HMI Substation gateway Control room view of the grid. Control room view of the grid. ![FV-Isolate module icon](/assets/isolate-icon-B9t8fl3o.png)Isolate ![FV-Execute module icon](/assets/execute-icon-kJl5Gtmk.png)Execute Switching and protection changes need approval before they reach the substation. L1 Substation control Field IEC 61850 IEDs Protection relays RTUs Bay control and protection inside the substation. Bay control and protection inside the substation. ![FV-Lock module icon](/assets/lock-icon-UU3vOaKE.png)Lock Bay devices tie to named protection engineers. L0 Primary plant Field Switchgear Transformers Sensors OSS Crown jewels Off-network Detail callout · A Offline Secure Storage Protection settings, substation configurations, EMS baselines and the recovery sets you need to restart the grid from a known-good state. Offline by design · secure by default Modules & symbols ![FV-Firebreak module icon](/assets/firebreak-icon-7zSCkB1t.png)Firebreak Physical sever ![FV-Validate module icon](/assets/vault-icon-DWJpRH8k.png)Validate Integrity check ![FV-Isolate module icon](/assets/isolate-icon-B9t8fl3o.png)Isolate Zone boundary ![FV-Relay module icon](/assets/relay-icon-CVhJDRO7.png)Relay Time-bound path ![FV-Execute module icon](/assets/execute-icon-kJl5Gtmk.png)Execute Approved action ![FV-Lock module icon](/assets/lock-icon-UU3vOaKE.png)Lock Named access DMZ boundary Trust transition OSS callout Off-network detail ### Where each module is deployed, and what it does there. One row per module. Placement on the network, then plain-English purpose at that point. 1. ![FV-Isolate module icon](/assets/isolate-icon-B9t8fl3o.png) Isolate At every Purdue boundary Office, ICCP, control centre and substation fabrics are physically separate. A compromise on the corporate side cannot reach protection. 2. ![FV-Firebreak module icon](/assets/firebreak-icon-7zSCkB1t.png) Firebreak On the L5 to L4 link and the L4 to L3.5 link A real off switch on the public and office boundaries when an incident is in flight. 3. ![FV-Validate module icon](/assets/vault-icon-DWJpRH8k.png) Validate On the L5 to L4 link and inside the L3.5 DMZ ICCP and engineering traffic is checked for origin, integrity and authority before it reaches operations. 4. ![FV-Relay module icon](/assets/relay-icon-CVhJDRO7.png) Relay Inside the L3.5 DMZ Cross-domain data moves on scheduled routes. Nothing streams unattended into the control centre. 5. ![FV-Execute module icon](/assets/execute-icon-kJl5Gtmk.png) Execute Inside the L3.5 DMZ and on the L2 to L1 link Firmware, settings and switching actions hold until the right authority signs them off. 6. ![FV-Lock module icon](/assets/lock-icon-UU3vOaKE.png) Lock On the L3 to L2 link and the L1 to L0 link The closer you get to primary plant, the tighter the named access. Standing access into substations is the exception. Featured In [![TechRadar Pro logo](/press/techradar-pro-logo.svg) ](https://www.techradar.com/pro/uk-startup-put-physical-disconnect-switch-in-its-cloud-storage-offering-to-mitigate-ransomware-attacks-but-will-that-be-enough "Read about Firevault on TechRadar Pro") [![Yahoo Finance logo](/assets/yahoo-finance-logo-white-aNkUpCH7.png) ](https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/firevault-launches-help-businesses-directors-074500961.html "Read about Firevault on Yahoo Finance") [![Channel Insider logo](/assets/channel-insider-logo-white-CFFo4iu7.png) ](https://www.channelinsider.com/security/tools-and-platforms/firevault-security-offline-platform-offering/ "Read about Firevault on Channel Insider") [![Security Buyer logo](/assets/security-buyer-logo-white-o6oIaBWz.png) ](https://securitybuyer.com/uk-cybersecurity-startup-launches-firevault/ "Read about Firevault on Security Buyer") [![SecurityBrief logo]() ](https://securitybrief.com.au/story/firevault-unveils-offline-digital-vault-to-combat-rising-cyber-risks "Read about Firevault on SecurityBrief") Capabilities ## What you get with every deployment 01 ### Sovereign grid data Grid control and protection data remains within the agreed jurisdiction in carefully selected Firevault Bunkers. 02 ### Multi-party control Critical switching and protection changes require sign-off from both control room and security teams. 03 ### Regulatory evidence Continuous compliance evidence for NIS2, NERC CIP and Ofgem cyber expectations. 04 ### Out-of-band management Cellular and dedicated paths keep the control plane reachable when primary networks are compromised. 05 ### Tamper-proof logging Every access, configuration change and switching command lands in immutable logs on physically separate infrastructure. 06 ### Verified configuration baselines Verified baselines of EMS, IED and SCADA configuration enable a known-good restore of control-plane state. Demo to Live ## Adoption Guide Step 1 #### Network assessment Map every path between corporate IT, ICCP, EMS, SCADA and substation networks to identify convergence and persistent vendor connections. Step 2 #### Zone architecture design Design physically separated zones aligned to your control rooms and substation estate, with Control modules at each boundary. Step 3 #### Non-production pilot Deploy in a test environment mirroring an EMS and substation pair with full zone separation, multi-party authorisation and compliance logging. Step 4 #### Operational deployment Full deployment across the grid estate with verified configuration baselines, continuous compliance evidence and 24/7 out-of-band management. Step 1 #### Network assessment Map every path between corporate IT, ICCP, EMS, SCADA and substation networks to identify convergence and persistent vendor connections. Step 2 #### Zone architecture design Design physically separated zones aligned to your control rooms and substation estate, with Control modules at each boundary. Step 3 #### Non-production pilot Deploy in a test environment mirroring an EMS and substation pair with full zone separation, multi-party authorisation and compliance logging. Step 4 #### Operational deployment Full deployment across the grid estate with verified configuration baselines, continuous compliance evidence and 24/7 out-of-band management. [Organise a Demo](/contact) Relevant Control Blueprints ## Deployment patterns that apply here [ CP-05 FIRE+VAULT ### Protect Critical Infrastructure Keep critical systems available, controlled and disconnected from unnecessary exposure. View blueprint ](/control-blueprints/cp-05)[ CP-04 FIRE ### Enforce Physical Segmentation Segmentation should not just be logical. It should be physically enforceable. View blueprint ](/control-blueprints/cp-04)[ CP-02 FIRE ### Contain Active Breaches When prevention fails, containment must be physical, immediate and provable. View blueprint ](/control-blueprints/cp-02)[ CP-01 FIRE ### Stop Kill-Chain Ransomware Stop ransomware moving, spreading or reaching the crown jewels. View blueprint ](/control-blueprints/cp-01) ## Explore More [ ### Control for Utilities The parent view across power, water and gas networks. Learn more about Control for Utilities ](/control-for-utilities)[ ### Control for Critical Infrastructure National-grade security for essential services. Learn more about Control for Critical Infrastructure ](/control-for-critical-infrastructure)[ ### IT/OT Convergence Threat Physically separate IT from operational technology. Learn more about IT/OT Convergence Threat ](/control-for-it-ot-convergence)[ ### Control for Renewables Wind, solar and battery sites with heavy OEM remote access. Learn more about Control for Renewables ](/control-for-utilities-renewables) Questions ## Frequently Asked How does Control work with existing EMS and SCADA? Can ICCP and market data still flow between operators? How does this affect protection engineering work? What about DER and inverter-based resources? Energy blueprint - PoC ### Speak to the team to organise a PoC Walk through your blueprint with the Firevault team and scope a proof of concept on your estate. 30 minutes, no sales pitch. Book a PoC conversation