Recent Breaches
Breaches
2026PowerSchool62.4M stolen62.4M records stolen2026DISA Global Solutions3.3M stolen3.3M records stolen2026Globe Life850K stolen850K records stolen2026Co-operative Group6.5 million members (names, contact details, dates of birth) stolen6.5 million members (names, contact details, dates of birth) records stolen2026HarrodsAttempted intrusion, limited disruption stolenAttempted intrusion, limited disruption records stolen2026Legal Aid Agency (Ministry of Justice)2.1 million applicants (financial, criminal, contact data since 2010) stolen2.1 million applicants (financial, criminal, contact data since 2010) records stolen2026Adidas UKCustomer contact details (subset) stolenCustomer contact details (subset) records stolen2026Peter Green ChilledOrder and logistics data stolenOrder and logistics data records stolen2026Jaguar Land RoverProduction and IT systems disrupted stolenProduction and IT systems disrupted records stolen2026Collins Aerospace (RTX)Check-in and boarding disruption across Heathrow, Brussels, Berlin stolenCheck-in and boarding disruption across Heathrow, Brussels, Berlin records stolen2026Co-operative Group6.5 million members (names, contact details, dates of birth) stolen6.5 million members (names, contact details, dates of birth) records stolen2026HarrodsAttempted intrusion, limited disruption stolenAttempted intrusion, limited disruption records stolen2026Legal Aid Agency (Ministry of Justice)2.1 million applicants (financial, criminal, contact data since 2010) stolen2.1 million applicants (financial, criminal, contact data since 2010) records stolen2026Adidas UKCustomer contact details (subset) stolenCustomer contact details (subset) records stolen2026Peter Green ChilledOrder and logistics data stolenOrder and logistics data records stolen2026Jaguar Land RoverProduction and IT systems disrupted stolenProduction and IT systems disrupted records stolen2026Collins Aerospace (RTX)Check-in and boarding disruption across Heathrow, Brussels, Berlin stolenCheck-in and boarding disruption across Heathrow, Brussels, Berlin records stolen2026PowerSchool62.4M stolen62.4M records stolen2026DISA Global Solutions3.3M stolen3.3M records stolen2026Globe Life850K stolen850K records stolen
View All →
Threat Response

Protect Infrastructure Through Management Plane Isolation

When an attacker reaches the management plane, they control everything. Physical separation between management interfaces and production networks ensures that compromise of one does not mean compromise of all.

Back to Control
Control by Firevault product icon

Threat Response

If your management plane is reachable from your production network, your security controls are only as strong as the weakest credential on that network. Physical separation makes the management plane disconnected regardless of what credentials an attacker holds.

78%

Of network breaches involve management plane access

Zero

Management interfaces reachable from production networks

Physical

Separation between management and data planes

100%

Administrative sessions on tamper-proof audit trail

The Threat

The management plane is the keys to the kingdom.

Shared Network Paths

Management interfaces for switches, firewalls, and servers share the same physical network as production traffic. An attacker on the production network can reach management interfaces through lateral movement.

Credential Harvesting

Administrative credentials captured through phishing or credential stuffing provide direct access to management interfaces, allowing attackers to reconfigure security controls and disable monitoring.

Configuration Tampering

Once on the management plane, attackers modify firewall rules, disable logging, create backdoor accounts, and reconfigure routing to maintain persistent access and exfiltrate data.

The Scenario

Scenario: Management Plane Takeover

An attacker compromises a web application server in a financial services firm and discovers that the management interface for the core firewall is reachable from the same network segment. Using a known vulnerability in the firewall management portal, they gain administrative access and disable the IDS, modify ACLs to allow data exfiltration, and create a persistent backdoor. The security team's monitoring tools show nothing because the attacker disabled the alerts from the management plane. With Control, the firewall management interface exists on a physically separate network. The attacker on the compromised web server has no path to the management plane, regardless of what vulnerabilities they discover or what credentials they harvest.

"They owned our firewall for three weeks. Every log, every alert, every rule was under their control. We did not know because the first thing they did was disable the monitoring from the management plane."

Management plane abuse

How Control removes the management plane as a single failure point.

If an attacker takes the management plane, they take the rules. Control places enforcement in the physical conduit, not in a console, so a compromised admin tier cannot quietly relax the boundary.

Mapped to ATT&CK T1098 Account Manipulation, T1556 Authentication Modification, NIST SP 800-53 AC and IEC 62443-3-3 SR 1, SR 2 and SR 5.

  1. ST 01

    Admin Tier Foothold

    TA0001

    ◤ Attacker

    Lands on a privileged workstation or steals a credential with reach into the management console.

    ◢ Control breaks it

    Access to the management tier requires a named, time-bound session. There is no standing path from corporate IT to the console.

    FV-Lock module iconLockFV-Relay module iconRelay
    ✕ Break here
  2. ST 02

    Policy and Rule Tampering

    T1098

    ◤ Attacker

    Edits firewall rules, IAM bindings or change-management gates so future malicious activity looks legitimate.

    ◢ Control breaks it

    Boundary enforcement is physical, not policy. A rule change in a console cannot open a conduit that has been severed.

    FV-Firebreak module iconFirebreakFV-Isolate module iconIsolate
    ✕ Break here
  3. ST 03

    Evidence Tampering

    T1070

    ◤ Attacker

    Deletes or alters logs, audit trails and detection signals to hide the work already done.

    ◢ Control breaks it

    Audit and config artefacts are pushed to the offline vault. Once captured, they are out of the attacker's reach.

    FV-Archive module iconArchiveFV-Validate module iconValidate
    ✕ Break here
  4. ST 04

    Wide Blast Action

    TA0040

    ◤ Attacker

    Pushes a destructive change from the management console out to every connected system at once.

    ◢ Control breaks it

    The Firebreak severs all governed conduits on alert. The console can issue the change, but the path to apply it is gone.

    FV-Firebreak module iconFirebreakFV-Execute module iconExecute

Outcome · outcome block

Compromising the management plane no longer means owning the environment. Physical enforcement keeps the boundary even when the console lies.

Modules & symbols

FV-Lock module iconLockNamed access
FV-Relay module iconRelayTime-bound path
FV-Firebreak module iconFirebreakPhysical sever
FV-Isolate module iconIsolateZone boundary
FV-Archive module iconArchiveDisconnected copy
FV-Validate module iconValidateIntegrity check
FV-Execute module iconExecuteApproved action
Break hereChain severed by Firevault
Attacker stepMITRE ATT&CK tactic

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Key Capabilities

Physical Plane Separation

Management and production traffic exist on physically separate networks. No VLAN, no firewall rule, no ACL. Separate physical infrastructure.

Controlled Management Access

Administrative sessions require multi-party authorisation and are confined to time-bound windows with full session recording.

Credential Isolation

Administrative credentials are bound to the management plane network. They cannot be used from production network paths even if compromised.

Emergency Lockdown

A single authorised command physically severs all management plane access, preserving production operations with the current configuration.

Immutable Configuration History

Every configuration change is recorded on physically disconnected storage, providing a tamper-proof audit trail and rollback capability.

Compliance Evidence

Physical management plane separation maps directly to ISO 27001, NIS2, and NIST CSF requirements for administrative access control.

Demo to Live

Adoption Guide

Step 1

Management Plane Audit

Map every management interface, administrative path, and credential that can reach network infrastructure management from the production network.

Step 2

Plane Separation Design

Design physically separate management and production networks with controlled access points, multi-party authorisation requirements, and session recording policies.

Step 3

Core Infrastructure Pilot

Deploy management plane isolation for core network infrastructure (firewalls, core switches), testing administrative workflows and emergency lockdown procedures.

Step 4

Full Infrastructure Deployment

Extend to all managed infrastructure with automated session governance, tamper-proof logging, and continuous compliance evidence generation.

Step 1

Management Plane Audit

Map every management interface, administrative path, and credential that can reach network infrastructure management from the production network.

Step 2

Plane Separation Design

Design physically separate management and production networks with controlled access points, multi-party authorisation requirements, and session recording policies.

Step 3

Core Infrastructure Pilot

Deploy management plane isolation for core network infrastructure (firewalls, core switches), testing administrative workflows and emergency lockdown procedures.

Step 4

Full Infrastructure Deployment

Extend to all managed infrastructure with automated session governance, tamper-proof logging, and continuous compliance evidence generation.

Questions

Frequently Asked

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