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Control Module FV-02

Isolate Double-boundary network separation

Isolate adds physical connection control to both sides of an assessed intermediate zone. The design reduces reliance on a single logical boundary between public-facing and protected environments.

Separate the zones. Control both crossings.

Incident

Path exposed

Outcome

Control taken

The problem

The problem Isolate addresses.

A network zone can be exposed through more than one side. A DMZ or intermediate environment needs its inbound and outbound crossings considered together, with clear rules for which connections may exist.

What it does

Isolate adds physical connection control to both sides of an assessed intermediate zone. The design reduces reliance on a single logical boundary between public-facing and protected environments.

Before a connection changes

Every deployment starts with a named physical boundary, a defined normal state, mapped dependencies, an agreed decision-maker, failure behaviour and a tested restoration method. Disconnecting one controlled link does not remove alternative routes outside the design.

The physical-control arrangement

Two controlled crossings around one intermediate zone. Agreed before it is needed.

A double-protection arrangement with independently controlled physical connection points on both sides of a defined intermediate zone.

  1. Map both crossings

    Map the outer and inner crossings of the intermediate zone.

  2. Agree permitted combinations

    Assign normal states and the permitted combinations of the two crossings.

  3. Authorise the change

    Authorise any change through the agreed decision-maker.

  4. Apply at the right boundary

    Apply the selected physical state at the correct boundary.

  5. Verify reachability

    Verify the resulting zone reachability and the restoration path.

What it does

  • Control both sides of a protected intermediate zone, rather than relying on a single network crossing.
  • Acts only on the registered crossings in the agreed design.
  • Records the command, the reported state and any independent verification separately.

What it does not claim

  • Two controlled crossings do not prove complete segmentation if redundant, cellular, wireless or shared-service paths bypass the design.
  • Act on routes outside the registered design.

See it work

Two controlled crossings. One intermediate zone.

Three labelled zones with a separately controlled boundary on each side of the intermediate zone. The states of the two crossings are agreed together, not as a single switch.

Public-facing

Intermediate zone

Protected

Public-facing networkInternet and partner services
Intermediate zoneDMZ services and exchange hosts
Protected environmentSystems that must stay protected

Stage

Agreed normal combination

The outer crossing serves the public service. The inner crossing rests disconnected, so the intermediate zone does not reach the protected environment.

Normal states agreed by the service and security owners.

Commanded
No change.
Reported by the control point
Outer connected. Inner held disconnected.
Independently verified
Matches the state confirmed at the last test.

Selected boundary

Isolate module emblem: two magenta and slate forward chevrons, for double-boundary network separationIsolate · FV-02 Outer crossingPublic-facing network to intermediate zone · IT, Cyber, CNI
Normal state
Connected for the published public service.
What changes it
An authorised change or an assessed incident decision.
What Isolate does
Isolate controls the outer crossing independently of the inner crossing.

Concept illustration. Two controlled crossings do not prove complete segmentation if redundant, cellular, wireless or shared-service paths bypass the design.

Operational boundaries and tests

Agreed in advance. Tested before it counts.

Every deployment starts with a named physical boundary, a defined normal state, mapped dependencies, an agreed decision-maker, failure behaviour and a tested restoration method. Disconnecting one controlled link does not remove alternative routes outside the design.

Before you rely on it

What has to be true first.

  • The design names each boundary, its normal state and who can change it.
  • Dependencies are mapped, including what must keep running.
  • In OT and CNI, the process reaches a safe state before a route is withdrawn.
  • Failure behaviour and the restoration method are agreed and tested.
  • Wireless, cellular and other routes outside the design need their own controls.

Acceptance tests

Prove the operating conditions, not just the command.

  • Command, device-reported state and independent verification are recorded as separate observations.
  • Safe disconnection and restoration are tested in a planned window.
  • Each permitted combination of the outer and inner crossings is tested, including the restoration order.
  • Alternative physical, wireless and cellular paths remain in scope for architecture review.

No guaranteed timing or universal fail-closed state is implied. Observed timings belong to the tested installation.

Related Control Plans

Adopt Isolate through a Control Plan.

The solutions. CP-01 to CP-17 apply the appropriate Modules to defined security and operational problems.

CP-11 Control Plan

CP-11 IT/OT Boundary Protection Control Plan iconIT/OT Boundary Protection

Control the crossings between business IT and operational technology, without treating the process like office IT.

Open CP-11

CP-12 Control Plan

CP-12 Critical System Exposure Reduction Control Plan iconCritical System Exposure Reduction

Reduce the number of connections that can reach essential systems, so fewer routes stay open by default.

Open CP-12

Industry Blueprints adapt the Plans to each sector's systems, suppliers, continuity requirements and safety constraints. Explore the Blueprints.

Questions

Straight answers.

For security, network and operations owners.

What does Isolate do?

Isolate adds physical connection control to both sides of an assessed intermediate zone. The design reduces reliance on a single logical boundary between public-facing and protected environments.

What problem does it address?

A network zone can be exposed through more than one side. A DMZ or intermediate environment needs its inbound and outbound crossings considered together, with clear rules for which connections may exist.

How is the physical control arranged?

A double-protection arrangement with independently controlled physical connection points on both sides of a defined intermediate zone.

What does it not claim?

Two controlled crossings do not prove complete segmentation if redundant, cellular, wireless or shared-service paths bypass the design.

How does Isolate relate to Control Plans?

Modules are the physical control capabilities. Control Plans apply the appropriate Modules to a defined security or operational problem; the design for your own connections is produced with Firevault in Control Studio. Isolate is used in CP-11 IT/OT Boundary Protection and CP-12 Critical System Exposure Reduction.

Is this a validated installation?

No. It is a reference arrangement. Deployment drawings, interlock behaviour, approvals, link-state verification and failure modes are confirmed for your estate in discovery and acceptance testing.

Your next step

Start with one critical connection.

We will help you identify the boundary, assess its dependencies and select the right Modules and Control Plans.

Discuss a critical connectionOr see all nine Modules