Problem 1
ICT risk management.
DORA Chapter II calls for ICT risk frameworks backed by demonstrable technical controls that go beyond policy documentation.

Control and DORA
DORA expects ICT risk management, incident handling and third-party risk governance you can demonstrate. Control provides a physical enforcement layer that evidences resilience beyond software controls.
As featured in




The problem
DORA asks firms to show, not describe, how ICT risk, third parties and recovery are controlled.
Financial system configurations held in Firevault Bunkers: Europe live, US and Middle East next.
Vendor sessions are multi-party authorised, time-limited and logged for regulatory review.
Automated logging that can help support DORA, FCA, PRA and EBA expectations.
Problem 1
DORA Chapter II calls for ICT risk frameworks backed by demonstrable technical controls that go beyond policy documentation.

Problem 2
Firms rely heavily on third-party ICT providers, creating the concentration risks DORA Chapter V addresses.

Problem 3
DORA requires regular resilience testing, including threat-led penetration testing, so recovery has to work under realistic conditions.

The mapping
From the ICT risk management framework to third-party contracts, each article mapped to the modules that evidence it.
| DORA article | Control modules | How Control helps |
|---|---|---|
| Art. 6ICT risk management framework |
|
Boundary enforcement is physical and continuously evidenced. |
| Art. 8Identification of ICT-supported business functions |
|
Crown-jewel functions sit behind a named, severed conduit by default. |
| Art. 9(2)ICT security measures |
|
Privileged actions require explicit approval and produce signed evidence. |
| Art. 9(4)Network and infrastructure security |
|
Zone boundaries are physically severed and reached only via governed conduits. |
| Art. 11(2)Response and recovery |
|
Recovery copies remain in an offline vault, disconnected from the live network. |
| Art. 11(4)ICT business continuity policy |
|
Restoration is an authorised Execute event with quorum approval and recorded intent. |
| Art. 28General principles for ICT third-party risk |
|
Vendor reach is severed by default; engagements run as time-bound Relay sessions. |
| Art. 30Contractual provisions on the use of ICT services |
|
Vendor sessions are named, scoped and revocable at the boundary. |
Alignment, not certification. Control can help support these measures; your assessor decides what satisfies them.
The scenario
Regulators ask how quickly a compromised vendor connection can be severed. Step through it, or play it through.
Step 1 of 2
A regulator finds 14 vendor connections with persistent access to production payment systems.
Backups share network infrastructure with production.
Step 2 of 2
With Control, vendor connections are physically governed with time-limited access windows.
The firm can show continuous evidence of ICT risk and third-party governance.
An illustrative scenario.
Capabilities
Six things Control gives a DORA programme, from the first boundary to the audit afterwards.
DORA
Financial system configurations held in Firevault Bunkers: Europe live, US and Middle East next.
DORA
Vendor sessions are multi-party authorised, time-limited and logged for regulatory review.
DORA
Automated logging that can help support DORA, FCA, PRA and EBA expectations.
DORA
Physical isolation provides containment boundaries for threat-led penetration testing.
DORA
Tamper-evident logs record ICT system access, third-party connections and incident response actions.
DORA
Verified control-plane baselines help demonstrate operational resilience.
Adoption guide
Map current ICT measures against DORA chapters to find where physical enforcement strengthens compliance.
Design physical ICT system boundaries and third-party governance across the applicable chapters.
Deploy Control and run threat-led testing to validate physical containment before your regulatory assessment.
Roll out with continuous regulatory evidence, third-party governance and baseline assurance.
Questions
Chapter II (ICT risk management), Chapter III (incident handling and recovery) and Chapter V (ICT third-party risk), as the mapping shows.
Physical isolation gives testers real containment boundaries to work against, and every action is logged.
It governs the paths to third parties: vendor reach is severed by default and opened as time-bound sessions, which can help support Chapter V.
In milliseconds, over an out-of-band command, through Firebreak.

Walk through DORA with the Firevault team and see where physical evidence fits your programme. Alignment, not certification.