
Opinion
US Technology Disruptions Continue: United Airlines and JPMorgan Chase Expose Critical Infrastructure Dependencies
United Airlines and JPMorgan Chase both suffered technology failures on 16 November, days after the Microsoft and FAA outages. Neither was a cyberattack, but together they show how far disruption can travel through connected dependencies.
Mark FermorCTO, CMO and Founder, Firevault
Published 16 November 2026 · 7 min read
Two major US organisations, two separate technology failures and another difficult day for America's critical services.
On Monday 16 November 2026, United Airlines suffered a technology disruption that delayed departing flights across the United States, while JPMorgan Chase confirmed a software bug that slowed transactions, with consequences reaching customers of other banks.
Neither incident has been identified as a cyberattack. Both companies said there was no indication of cyber involvement, and there is no evidence that the two failures are connected.
However, coming days after significant disruptions involving Microsoft and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), these incidents raise questions about the growing complexity of the infrastructure on which businesses, public services and millions of people depend.
United Airlines: another difficult day for US aviation
United confirmed on Monday afternoon that a technology issue was delaying departures, and later said it had been resolved. "While some flights were delayed, there was no impact on flights in progress, or on United Express flights," the airline said in a statement reported by CNBC. A United spokesperson said there was no indication that the outage was a cyberattack.
According to a message from the Air Line Pilots Association to its members, seen by Reuters, the outage affected multiple applications used by pilots and left United unable to provide final aircraft weights for departing flights. Pilots need those figures to complete their pre-departure calculations. AirlineGeeks reported crews in Denver, Chicago O'Hare and Newark describing problems with final weights, pushback requests and gate changes.
By 5.30pm Eastern Time, FlightAware showed 418 United flights delayed, about 13% of the airline's schedule, and 21 cancelled on Monday, Reuters reported. Those figures cover the whole day and do not show how many of the delays the technology issue itself caused.
Flights already airborne and United Express services were unaffected, indicating that the disruption was limited to particular parts of the airline's operations rather than a complete network failure. The aircraft and crews were ready. The data they needed to leave was not.
This came three days after an unrelated FAA failure triggered a nationwide ground stop on 13 November. In its own questions and answers, the FAA said legacy equipment became unstable when data flooded its network at a rate of 1,000 connection attempts every four to five seconds, disrupting aircraft communications and radar feeds. The initial investigation points to a radar site in Amarillo, Texas, and a radio communications site in El Dorado, Arkansas, where the FAA's network provider, L3Harris, had been deploying a new router. The network stabilised once those two locations were blocked, and air traffic resumed more than four hours after the ground stop began.
That incident demonstrated how a relatively localised technical problem can have consequences across a much larger operational environment, and how recovery can depend on cutting off the part that is causing harm.
For aviation, where safety, availability and interconnected systems are fundamental, understanding critical dependencies and limiting the spread of disruption is essential. We explored the same theme after the UK's NATS outage in September.
JPMorgan Chase: when one bank's failure affects another bank's customers
Meanwhile, JPMorgan Chase said it had "experienced a temporary issue related to a software bug in on-premise hardware systems", adding that "there is no evidence this is cyber-related", according to Good Morning America. Some transactions took longer than usual, although the bank said customers still had access to their accounts and funds.
Outage reports spiked on Downdetector for Chase, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, U.S. Bank, PNC, Citigroup, Capital One and Zelle, Yahoo Finance reported, initially suggesting a much broader banking outage. Downdetector counts user reports, which do not necessarily mean a bank's own systems have failed.
Subsequent statements revealed an important distinction. U.S. Bank said it was "not directly impacted", but that clients sending or receiving Zelle payments with another financial institution might experience delays. Zelle said its network was "operating as it should". JPMorgan told CNBC that other banks "may have been impacted by slowness in transactions only to the extent that they were a party to a transaction with us."
Your bank does not have to fail for your banking to stop working.
An organisation may have functioning infrastructure, effective security controls and available internal systems, yet remain dependent on another organisation's ability to deliver a critical service.
When that dependency fails, the consequences can extend well beyond the organisation experiencing the original problem.
Different failures, shared questions
In the space of five days, significant technology disruptions have affected Microsoft, the FAA, United Airlines and JPMorgan Chase. Microsoft has attributed its global Outlook outage, which began on 12 November, to a latent defect introduced in a July update that caused networking gateway servers to become overwhelmed under increased load, ABC News reported.
These are separate incidents with different reported causes. There is no established common technical failure and no evidence of a coordinated cyberattack.
But the sequence raises a question that deserves greater attention.
We have become exceptionally good at connecting everything. Have we become equally good at controlling what happens when something fails?
Modern organisations operate through complex relationships between networks, applications, infrastructure providers, suppliers and third-party services.
Connectivity enables businesses to operate at scale, but it also creates dependencies and potential pathways through which disruption or compromise can spread.
Monday's incidents are not evidence of malicious activity. However, the interconnected environments involved are also relevant to cybersecurity, particularly when considering ransomware, supply chain compromise and unauthorised access.
A technical failure and a cyberattack may have entirely different causes, but both can expose the consequences of relying on systems beyond an organisation's direct control.
When connected systems can no longer be trusted
Cybersecurity strategies rightly focus on prevention, detection, monitoring and recovery.
But what happens when an organisation can no longer trust part of its connected environment?
Can compromised infrastructure be isolated before an attacker moves further into the network? Can access through third-party connections be restricted? Can sensitive systems remain protected while an incident is investigated?
And crucially, can valuable information remain beyond the reach of an attacker who has already gained access?
These questions concern more than restoring services. They are about maintaining security boundaries, containing threats and ensuring that a compromise in one environment does not automatically expose everything connected to it.
The importance of independent control
At Firevault, this is central to how we approach cyber resilience.
Control by Firevault gives organisations physical control over the network connections around their critical infrastructure. Connections can be restricted or removed, boundaries can be established between environments, and access can be provided just in time, so a path into a critical system exists when approved work needs it and is physically absent when it does not.
Offline Secure Storage® protects sensitive information, intellectual property and valuable digital assets by keeping them on dedicated hardware that is physically disconnected and offline by default, reducing exposure to network-based threats.
Neither approach would have prevented the reported software faults affecting United Airlines or JPMorgan Chase.
But both address important security considerations in an increasingly connected world: limiting exposure, controlling access and protecting critical assets when connected environments are compromised.
A question for every technology leader
The incidents unfolding across the United States demonstrate how dependent essential services have become on complex, interconnected technology.
For cybersecurity leaders, the lesson is not that connectivity itself is the problem, or that every technical failure represents a security incident.
It is that organisations need a clear understanding of their dependencies, the boundaries between trusted systems and the controls available when those boundaries are threatened.
That means looking beyond whether security tools are functioning and asking what happens if a trusted connection becomes a route for compromise.
Protecting critical infrastructure is not simply about preventing an attacker from gaining access. It is about controlling what they can reach, containing the consequences and ensuring that what matters most remains protected.
Mark Fermor is CTO, CMO and Founder of Firevault. Explore the Aviation Blueprint and the Banking Blueprint, or talk to the team.
Questions
United described it as a technology issue affecting departing flights and said there was no indication it was cybersecurity-related. A pilots' union message seen by Reuters said multiple pilot applications were affected and final aircraft weights could not be provided. Flights in progress and United Express flights were not affected.
JPMorgan Chase said it was a temporary issue related to a software bug in on-premise hardware systems and that there was no evidence it was cyber-related. Other banks' customers were affected only where Chase was party to their transactions.
There is no evidence that they are. Each has a different reported cause, and none has been attributed to a coordinated cyberattack. Together they show how far disruption can travel through connected dependencies.
No. Neither Control by Firevault nor Offline Secure Storage® would have prevented the reported software faults. Both address a different question: limiting what can be reached, controlling access and keeping critical assets protected when a connected environment can no longer be trusted.

About the author
Mark FermorCTO, CMO and Founder of Firevault. Mark writes on physical control, offline storage and the incidents that show why both matter.
Why #OSS
Keep a clean copy out of reach.
Offline Secure Storage® keeps one copy physically disconnected at the hardware level between sessions.
Control
Govern the paths attackers depend on.
Physical, out-of-band control of selected network paths, composed into Control Plans and industry Blueprints.

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